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ABSTRACT
Religious conflicts have become raised significantly after political reform in Indonesia. One of 
among conflict cases is Ahmadiyah sect as struggling minorities who spreading their influence 
in the middle of Sunni Islam majority. The conflict escalated and manifest in violence during the 
2000s. The government eventually enacted Joint Ministerial Decree (SKB 3 Menteri) in 2008, which 
constrained preaching activities of Ahmadiyah who being accused of heresy. However, the decree did 
not stop the violence against Ahmadiyah. The conflict of Ahmadiyah was not solely about the heresy 
that charged on the Ahmadis, but also involving the contest of values, ideas, and authority between 
the liberal and pluralist Muslim groups versus the conservative Muslim groups. While the policy 
embodies controversial state as it perpetuates majority domination as well as close opportunities 
for constructive dialogues between the conflicting parties, this article views it as a resolution to 
anticipate the worst scenario. Therefore, the state’s role as a policy maker is still needed to actualize 
social order, national stability and keep the democratic life under control.
Key words: religious conflict, public policy, democracy, social order.
INTRODUCTION
Ahmadiyah is a minority sect who has 
an intersection with Islam. However, their 
teaching is contradicted extremely with the 
central belief of Sunni Islam. For example, 
they are admitting the founder, Mirza Ghulam 
Ahmad, as a prophet after Prophet Muhammad. 
Certainly almost Muslim groups in Indonesia 
reject their missionary effort. Therefore, 
Ahmadiyah followers have been under pressure 
since its emergence in the country about 90 
years ago. Nevertheless, after the political 
reform of 1998, the pressure on them was 
shifting into violence: the mob dissolute their 
rituals, destruct the mosques and persecute 
their members. Ahmadiyah is dealing with 
conservative Islamic groups that represent the 
majority Muslim in Indonesia. Among others 
are FPI (Islamic Defender Front), FUI (Islam 
Ummah Forum), GARIS (Islamic Reform 
Movement), LPPI (Institute for Research and 
Islamic Studies), and FUUI (Indonesian Ulama 
Ummah Forum) who supported by a semi-
state religious organization, MUI (Indonesian 
Council of Ulama). 
In 2008, the government issued a Joint 
Ministerial Decree prohibiting Ahmadiyah 
missionary activities and rituals openly. The 
policy is considered to be contrary to the 
democracy and human rights principle that 
guarantees freedom of individuals or groups in 
performing their religious rituals (As’ad, 2009: 
400). Interestingly, Fuller (2011: 3) shows that 
Ahmadiyah decree ironically triggers more 
severe marginalization and violence against the 
Ahmadis. Therefore, the decree was seen as the 
state’s position in favor of the majority power 
and failed to protect the minority group interest 
(Crouch, 2009: 3). 
Various studies have concluded that the 
imposition of Ahmadiyah decree was a setback 
for Indonesia democracy. The International Crisis 
Group report entitled Indonesia: Implications 
of the Ahmadiyah Decree (2008) states that the 
enactment of the Ahmadiyah decree was the 
point of a movement toward a model of Saudi 
Arabia that would banish religious freedom in 
Indonesia. Other studies express the causes of 
Ahmadiyah conflict. Burhani (2014: 1) reveals 
that the violence against Ahmadiyah is due to 
their vague position between the Islamic and 
non-Islamic. Non-Muslim or infidel groups are 
relatively safer from the majority oppression 
because Islam has the arrangement to set up 
social relations with them while there is no 
place for the heresy. Moreover, the violence 
against Ahmadiyah was also affected by the 
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strengthening of intolerance since the fall of 
the authoritarian regime in 1998. Hicks (2013: 
15) shows that the Ahmadiyah conflict was 
also caused by the political and authorities 
competition dimension among religious leaders. 
Fanani (2011: 27) utters that the violence on 
Ahmadiyah was a result of the strengthening of 
local political leaders who gain political benefit 
by displaying the traditional interpretation of 
the Sharia. Nevertheless, a little of those studies 
highlight the decree as a policy that managed 
to counterweight social order after the conflict 
got escalated and widen among liberalist and 
pluralist groups versus conservative Muslim 
groups.
This article focuses on the conflict 
escalation around Ahmadiyah decree enactment 
that involving two contentious Islamic groups, 
liberalist and pluralist groups versus conservative 
groups. The central argument of this paper is that 
instead intended as a resolution for Ahmadiyah, 
the decree had curbed the worst scenario of 
those groups that have access to mobilize a large 
amount of masses. This article probe on how 
the decree enactment, although considered has 
injured human rights, should be seen as a public 
policy that seeks to bring back social order in 
the midst of the national chaos threat. The 
preservation of social order becomes the priority 
on public policy process when the government 
distracted between the opposing interest groups.
Public Policy On Religious Affair 
The Ahmadiyah decree is a public policy 
product. We shall understand the process and 
characteristic of it as part of the democratic 
system that involves civil society’s role. The 
involvement of civil society in public policy-
making process is a prerequisite of a democratic 
system (Sewell, 2005: 95). This is to ensure the 
civil society, groups participation and reducing 
the state dominance in public policy making 
(Ingram & Smith, 2011: 4). However, citizen 
participation does not necessarily produce a 
democratic public policy. Luton (1996: 194) 
reveals there are less desired impacts from 
the overwhelming of citizens participation in 
public policymaking: (1) when the citizen’s 
participation is too high, the implementation of 
public policies will be constrained due to the 
strain of groups intervention, (2) participation 
of citizens too sporadic and fragmented 
so the public policies generated are less 
effective in addressing social problems, (3) the 
overwhelming participation can drive public 
policy in the hands of the wrong people and 
bring the wrong policy.
The policy itself is inseparable from 
various and contested orientations or interest 
among civil society groups. Even in the most 
democratic country, there are still plenty of 
civil society groups who struggle for their 
religious belief. Therefore, the government 
produces policies that rule religious affair, such 
as marriage, funeral, and divorce. However, for 
some people, the state involvement in religious 
affair is considered as insufficient. They are 
demanding the state to enact more religious 
public policies. But for some people, the policies 
are excessive and call the government to handle 
it down (Sharkansky, 1996: 2). This is relevant 
to the distinction view between libertarians and 
conservative about how the government should 
intervene through public policy. Libertarians 
invoke the state to minimize interference in 
economic and social policy and believe that 
private bore better results than government 
intervention. On the other hand, conservatives’ 
view that individual freedom should be limited 
to preserve social order and fulfill the rights 
of communities (Carrow, 1998: 6). However, 
regardless of the debate, the government has 
the authority and legitimacy to impose policies 
in urgent circumstances, to resolve the social 
conflict for example (Dukes, 1996: 15). 
The process of public policy cannot be 
separated from political influence as political 
parties and civil societies continue to struggle 
their interests. There are several theories 
explaining how the political forces influencing 
the public policy making. State-centered theory 
sees the state as an autonomous actor who 
generally unresponsive to outside influences. 
Pluralist theory considers the parties outside the 
government influence the policy. Proponents 
of this theory lately focused on the role of 
public opinion and influence policy making 
(Peoples & Gortari, 2008: 44). This study 
looks the public policy process in the dynamic 
movement between the state that prioritizes 
national stability (state-centered) amid the 
demands of various civil societies (pluralist).
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The Nature Of Religious Conflict 
When religious groups have discord interest 
and tarnishing each other in an object, there 
would be a tense conflict. Although each religion 
called peace, but the claims of divinity remain a 
subject to ignite conflict (Gort & Vroom, 2002: 4). 
The contentious groups would also interfere the 
government through a policy that could comply 
with their interests. Sociologically, one form of 
social conflict resolution in case majority against 
a minority is done through coercive regulation, 
in which minority groups are required to comply 
(Kriesberg, 1973: 108). However, the increasing 
openness of claims of ethnic, religious, and racial 
in modern society urged the government to issue 
an affirmative policy towards minority groups 
(Wilensky, 2002: 4). They who are affected by a 
government’s policy should also be provided the 
opportunity for struggling their demands (Woll, 
1981: 14). In this situation, the government holds 
an awry position. They are accused as undertake 
discrimination to the minority, supporting the 
majority, or violating the fairness. 
Despite government intervention, religious 
conflicts are often difficult to overcome for several 
reasons. First, there are cultural differences that 
could lead to conflict. Second, it is ascriptive 
which means the intergroup membership shift 
is almost impossible. Thirdly, they tend to fight 
for unity and achieve territorial sovereignty 
(Schlee, 2010: 4). The difficulty of handling 
religious conflict is also caused by the non-
realistic conflict characteristics where there is 
no practical motive in it but the conflict itself. 
According to Coser (Rodgers, 2003: 95), non-
realistic conflict is often used as a way to release 
tension, frustration, and strengthens the identity 
of a person or group. Non-realistic conflict is 
harder to relieved due to unclear objectives of 
both parties.
Basically, it is hard to see that there is 
really religious matter within the intergroup 
religious conflict. Religious conflicts are socially 
constructed, where the process is mostly driven 
by the problems at the elite level (Svensson, 
2013: 7). In Indonesia, social conflicts that contain 
religious dimension are influenced by social, 
economic and political factors. Such as the 
conflict of Nahdlatul Watan, Lombok, occurred 
between two descendants of a charismatic scholar 
who found the largest Islamic organization in 
the island. Raehan and Raehanun supporters are 
fighting over leadership succession (Hamidi & 
Smith, 2012). 
The bloody conflict that occurred in 
1999-2002 in the Moluccas between the two 
major camps, Christian and Muslim, have 
caused tens of thousands of casualties on both 
sides. Although the polarization of the conflict 
based on religious identities, but the perception 
that the conflict is due to the religious factor 
is very weak and is only supported by radical 
groups. The moderate Muslim groups do not 
see the conflict as a religious matter. They 
believe the conflict caused by the interests of 
the political elite and the tendency of groups 
to act violently (Ali, 2007). Wilson (2008: 8) 
who conducts studies ethnoreligious conflict 
in North Moluccas in 1999-2000 revealed that 
the conflict merely motivated by economic 
competition and political power among ethnic 
groups that has been fragmented since the 
days of colonialism and maintained in the era 
of authoritarian regimes. Those characteristic 
features of religious conflicts in Indonesia 
directing this study to browse the social factors 
around Ahmadiyah conflict.
Ahmadiyah: The Escalating Conflict
Ahmadiyah sect was born in Punjab, 
India in 1890s. Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, who 
declared himself as the messiah, founded the 
sect. Ahmadiyah opposed by many Muslims, 
especially Sunnis because his teachings are 
considered contrary to Islamic teachings, such 
as claim that Mirza can speak to God and he is 
a prophet. In 1974, the Muslim World League 
issued a fatwa declaring Ahmadis as outlawed 
group and should be placed as non-Islam 
(As’ad, 2009: 394-395).
Ahmadiyah then split into two parties 
after Mirza died in 1914. The first party called 
themselves Ahmadiyah Qadiyani led by Mirza’s 
son, Mahmud Ahmad. The second is Ahmadiyah 
Lahore led by Muhammad Ali and Kwaja Kamal 
Al-Din. The parting of Ahmadiyah was not just a 
matter of succession, but also contrast differences 
in doctrine. Qadiyani considers Mirza Ghulam 
Ahmad as a prophet and treat an outsider as the 
infidel. On the contrary, the Lahore teaching 
was friendlier towards Muslims. They do not 
consider Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as a prophet 
and did not consider an outsider as the infidel 
(As’ad, 2009: 395). However, most Muslims do 
56 Public Policy and Religious Conflict in Indonesia: The Case of Ahmadiyah
not recognize the distinction between Qadiyani 
and Lahore and treat them all as Ahmadiyah. 
Ahmadiyah Lahore came to Indonesia 
in 1924 to conduct missionary activities in 
Yogyakarta by Mirza Ahmad Wali and Maulana 
Ahmad Baig as preachers. While Ahmadiyah 
Qadiyani arrived in 1925, when students from 
Indonesia studying in Qadiyan, Rahmat Ali, 
went home and began to spread the teachings of 
Ahmadiyah in Sumatra. The ulama in Sumatra, then 
balked Ahmadiyah because their teaching was 
considered heretical and the followers charged 
as an apostate. However, the Ahmadiyah could 
survive the onslaught of rejection. On December 
16, 1935, Qadiyani group set up headquarters in 
Jakarta under the name Qadiyan Department 
Ahmadiyah Indonesia. In 1949, they changed 
the name of the organization into Jemaah 
Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI). The organization 
is a branch of the Ahmadiyah caliphate centered 
in Qadiyan, India. The Ahmadiyah Lahore 
chose not to set up an organization and did not 
recognize the Qadiyan Caliphate (As’ad, 2009: 
397).
JAI was trying to obtain a legal acknow-
ledgment from the Indonesian government. His 
efforts were successful on March 13, 1953, 
after the Ministry of Law issued a ministerial 
decree No. JA.5 / 23/13. In 2003, the existence 
of JAI legalized as Community Organization 
by the Directorate for Relations with Political 
Institutions of the Ministry Home Affairs 
through decree No. 75 / DI / VI / 2003 (As’ad, 
2009: 398).
The first refusal of the Ahmadiyah done 
by Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the largest Islamic 
organization in Indonesia. In 1935, NU issued a 
fatwa declaring Ahmadiyah heretical teachings 
and stated that the followers belong to infidels 
and apostates. In 1980, after performing 
an exploration on 9 books of Ahmadiyah 
teachings, the MUI declared Ahmadiyah as a 
deviant, perverted, and non-Islamists sect. In 
1984, MUI issued another fatwa to clarify the 
previous fatwa that strays Ahmadiyah (As’ad, 
2009: 400). Currently, the number of followers 
of Ahmadiyah estimated as many as 400,000 
people. A number of very minor compared to 
the 250 million people in Indonesia, which 
almost 90 percent are Muslim (Hicks, 2013: 
3). Interestingly, there is a similarity between 
Ahmadiyah and conservative Islamic groups, 
both of them are militants who fight to repel 
Christian missionaries (Ropi, 2010: 295). 
However, that semblance cannot unite them as 
each side is mutually tarnished.
In the post-reformation period, the move-
ment to challenge Ahmadiyah was rebound. 
In January 2005, a unit of the attorney who in 
charge to monitor religious sect held a meeting 
to discuss religious issues, such as Falun Gong 
and the Ahmadiyah sect issue. The meeting was 
attended by representatives of the police, military, 
Indonesian Intelligence Bureau (BIN), MUI, and 
several ministries. At the meeting, representatives 
of MUI recommended the government banning 
Ahmadiyah activities because of heresy and 
blemishing Islam (International Crisis Group, 
2008: 2). The development of Ahmadiyah in the 
post-reform era was also got surveillance and 
oppression from hardline Islamic conservative 
groups like the FPI and GARIS, which stretch 
their muscles since the fall of the authoritarian 
regime (Hicks, 2013: 7).
On 9 July 2005, a number of conservative 
Islamic groups, among others FUUI, FPI, and 
LPPI led an attack on Ahmadiyah in Parung 
Bogor that wounded eight people. Responding 
to the solicitudes, the government re-activated an 
institution that in charge to conduct surveillance 
to the defiant sect that could disturb public 
order, namely Coordination Agency Monitoring 
Mystical Beliefs in Society (Bakorpakem) 
(International Crisis Group, 2008: 3). One of 
their tasks at that time was kept watching on 
Ahmadiyah activities. At the 7th congress in the 
same month, the MUI issued a fatwa declaring 
Ahmadiyah heretical from Islam. Those who 
follow the Ahmadis declared as an apostate. 
MUI invited the congregation Ahmadiyah back 
on the straight doctrine (Islam) if they still claim 
to be Muslims and called the government to 
stop the Ahmadiyah missionary activity (Fuller, 
2011: 9). 
The conflict dimension was broadened 
when Ahmadiyah sect supported by liberalist 
Islamic groups and pluralist civil societies. 
Lutfi Assyaukanie, the leader of JIL (Liberal 
Islam Network), was very intense in opposing 
MUI and Islamic conservative groups regar-
ding Ahmadiyah fatwa. On the pluralist side, 
a humanitarian civil society named The Wahid 
Institute, which founded by Abdurrachman 
Wahid, persistently countering Ahmadiyah 
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discrimination. Oddly, Wahid was the most 
prominent figure of NU, which at the grass 
root level of the organization there was a strong 
rejection against Ahmadiyah. NU scholars 
had been struggling to dissolve the influence 
of Ahmadiyah in East Java since the 1920s. 
But today, Wahid and his colleagues have 
an agenda in promoting pluralism in social-
religious life including standing on Ahmadiyah. 
This condition has made the difficult position 
between several NU elites and its grass root 
regarding Ahmadiyah even though it never 
caused a conflict within their organization. 
Instead, the quarrel got heated up between 
Wahid followers against Islamic conservatives, 
especially FPI which backed by thousand 
partisans. On the other side, the Wahid, who 
was a descendant of NU founder, also have 
a vigorous access to several militant Islamic 
mass organizations such as Garda Bangsa, GP 
Ansor, and Banser NU. The circumstance was 
going wild and certainly placed the two masses 
in binary position that could lead to a severe 
social conflict anytime.
The conflict between the Wahid and FPI 
got escalated when Abdurrachman Wahid 
defends the existence of Ahmadiyah in front 
of FPI mass at a meeting in Purwakarta in 
May 2006. Wahid then accused the leaders 
of the group who attacked Ahmadiyah are the 
ones who paid by unnamed General. Those 
statements made FPI leaders angered and then 
expelled Wahid from the city. The aftermath of 
the events in Purwakarta has fueled tensions 
between FPI and Garda Bangsa. In the next 
event in Demak, Central Java, a mass of Garda 
Bangsa blocked the arrival of Habib Riziek, 
the FPI leader, who would give a speech at an 
Islamic boarding school. Garda Bangsa even 
intended to march to Jakarta to crush the FPI 
headquarters. Luckily the police had managed 
to prevent Garda Bangsa mass convoy so 
that the bloody conflict could be avoided 
(International Crisis Group, 2008: 4).
The conservative then gave more pressure 
to the government to dissolve Ahmadiyah. 
They thought the escalating and widening 
conflict would never meet a solution as long 
as the Ahmadiyah still conduct their activities. 
However, Abdurrahman Saleh, the Attorney 
General, had asked JAI leaders to set a dialogue 
with the Ministry of Religion official before 
the attorney submit recommendations to the 
president about Ahmadiyah dissolution. The 
results of September 2007 meeting brought 
out twelve points of the JAI statement to the 
ministerial team, among others, “(1) we Recite 
the declaration of faith that there is no God 
but Allah, and Mohammed is his Prophet; 
(2) we believe that Mohammed was the final 
prophet; (3) we believe Mirza Ghulam Ahmad 
to be a teacher and mentor, who inspired his 
followers to Strengthen the teachings of Islam as 
brought by the Prophet Mohammed; (4) in the 
induction Oath of Ahmadiyah we use the word 
“Mohammed” before “Prophet of God”; (5) we 
do not believe that divine revelation of Islamic law 
took place after the Holy Koran was revealed to 
Mohammed; and we follow the teachings of the 
Koran and the Prophet Mohammed; and (6) the 
Tadzkirah is not the holy book of the Ahmadiyah 
but a series of notes on the spiritual experience 
of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad that were compiled in 
1935, 27 years after his death” (International 
Crisis Group, 2008: 5).
However, the twelve points of Ahmadiyah 
statement did not please MUI and the conser-
vative groups anyway. They assumed the 
statements were multiple interpretations. The 
FPI and FUUI then continued to demand 
the Ministry of Religion to ban Ahmadiyah 
totally. On July 2007, Bakorpakem revealed 
the observations result on how the JAI really 
committed to the twelve statements on their 
practical realm. Based on their investigation, the 
JAI was assessed as inconsistent running their 
statement points and continue to implement the 
teachings that deviate from Islam that practiced 
in Indonesia, so JAI actions are deemed could 
threaten public order. Therefore, Bakorpakem 
reminded JAI to stop missionary activity or 
being dissolved. At the same time, Bakorpakem 
still recommended the government to issued 
a decree that could stop the activities of the 
Ahmadiyah sect (International Crisis Group, 
2008: 6).
The president did not respond the 
recommendation of Ahmadiyah dissolution imme-
diately. The members of President Advisory 
Council were split in addressing Ahmadiyah 
dissolution option. The council member who 
also represents MUI, Ma’ruf Amin, supports the 
disbanding Ahmadiyah option. While Adnan 
Buyung Nasution, a council member who 
58 Public Policy and Religious Conflict in Indonesia: The Case of Ahmadiyah
also a national human rights lawyer, saw the 
dissolution option would violate the constitution 
that guarantees the religious freedom. Other 
council members were also disturbed by Ahma-
diyah, but prefer persuasive measures so the 
Ahmadiyah followers could follow back the 
teachings of Islam. The diverse point of view in 
the council has made the government decision 
on Ahmadiyah prolonged (International Crisis 
Group, 2008: 6).
Meanwhile, the liberalist and pluralist 
groups were kept on expressing their support 
to Ahmadiyah through street demonstrations, 
which ignited open conflict with their opponent. 
On June 8, 2008, masses of FPI and Hizbuth 
Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) overwhelmed Monas 
Jakarta protesting the fuel price rising policy. 
At the same time, AKKBB (National Alliance 
for Freedom of Religion and Belief) mass and 
human rights activists conducted mass rally 
demanding pluralist tolerance and fighting 
radicalism. Although the police sought to dispel 
the mass from AKKBB to stay away from FPI 
and HTI, but the clash was unavoidable. Some 
activists of The Wahid Institute that joined in 
AKKBB were wounded. NU militia groups, 
then took revenge actions. In Cirebon, a mass 
from NU destroyed FPI signpost because their 
leader, Maman Immanulhaq Faqieh was one of 
the victims in Monas incident (Antaranews.
com, 2008). In Jakarta, GP Ansor, a youth 
organization under NU, demanded the 
government to dissolve FPI otherwise they 
would disband FPI with their own force (NU.
or.id, 2008). The Incident became a national 
issue and the president stated that the violence 
would never be accepted. 
Realized the Ahmadiyah issue was the 
trophy of discord, on June 9, thousands of 
people from the conservative groups held a 
demonstration in front of the presidential palace 
demanding the dissolution of Ahmadiyah. 
Considering the critical condition, three ministries 
then imposed a decree ordering Ahmadis to 
not perform their religious activities in public 
places. The policy actually did not match the 
desires of conservative groups who persist 
dissolution option because the decree still 
allowed Ahmadiyah religious activity. It streng-
thens a supposition that the Ahmadiyah decree 
was more intended to prevent larger conflicts, 
especially between Wahid supporters with FPI 
and other conservative groups (International 
Crisis Group, 2008: 7).
The enactment of Ahmadiyah decree 
was quite effective to anticipate the bloody 
conflict between two great masses that were 
not hesitating to use violent means. However, 
the policy does not immediately stop the 
mass repressive actions against Ahmadiyah 
in many regions. On June 11, 2008, a mob 
attacked an Ahmadiyah mosque in Palembang 
but was foiled by the police. On June 18, six 
Ahmadiyah mosques in Cianjur sealed by about 
100 people who call themselves followers 
of Ahlussunah Waljamaah. On June 20, FPI 
sealed an Ahmadiyah mosque in Makassar, 
South Sulawesi, a mob sealed two Ahmadiyah 
mosques in Cianjur and dozens of people 
blocked an Ahmadiyah mosque in Tangerang. 
On June 26, a mob sealed Ahmadiyah 
mosques in Cianjur and clashed with the police 
(International Crisis Group, 2008: 8). 
The violence against Ahmadis still conti-
nued. In February 2011, the attack on Ahmadiyah 
in Cikeusik, Banten, has killed three Ahmadis. 
The incident depicts the religious intolerance 
in Indonesia was getting worse (Fuller, 2011: 
5). The state was unable to protect its citizens 
from the issue of religious diversity. On the other 
side, the position of Ahmadiyah is also difficult 
because they are always being perceived 
attacking the central teachings of Islam, such 
as acknowledging Mirza as a prophet after 
Muhammad and have a holy book other than the 
Koran. Such teachings are not only annoying 
but also hurt almost all Muslims in Indonesia. 
A growing perception was put Ahmadiyah as  a 
sturdy heretic who struggle to bend Islam. As 
a result, the discourse of violence against the 
Ahmadis less attracted the public sympathy.
International Crisis Group (2008: 16) 
reports that the enactment of Ahmadiyah decree 
was also influenced by the political interests, 
especially regarding the presidential election 
in 2009. President of Indonesia at the time, 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, was eager to 
accommodate the government coalition parties 
who have helped deliver him as president in 
2004 to regain support in 2009 election. Among 
the coalition parties are Islamic ones, such 
as PKS, PPP, and PBB who tend to represent 
conservative values and also gave concern on 
Ahmadiyah issue. However, this allegation is 
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too far because the decree actually did not ban 
Ahmadiyah and the conservative groups yet 
unsatisfied with the policy. Thus, the practical 
political impetus behind the decree has no 
strong correlation.
Public Policy And Social Order 
The violence committed by conservative 
groups against Ahmadiyah is inseparable from 
the dialogue deadlock. Since the bloody tragedy 
in Cikeusik, some religious leaders urged the 
government to facilitate dialogue between 
religious groups addressing the issue of Ahma-
diyah. The issues grown in society were 
misinterpreted and encouraged the intensity 
of violence against the Ahmadis. Dialogues 
among conflicting parties have never reached 
the meeting point, because it is always about 
the truth of belief they owned, instead of 
a dialogue about citizenship mediated by 
independent parties (Fuller, 2011: 8).
The dialogue deadlock about Ahmadiyah 
religious teaching has taken place since the 
first of its rejection in 1925. However, although 
the organization of Islamic scholar rejected 
Ahmadiyah teachings at that time, there was no 
violence against them. Ironically, the violence 
against Ahmadiyah occurred in post-1998, the 
era of democratic government. The question 
is why the violence arose after the political 
reform? It should be underlined that the reform 
or democratic era did not only signify the 
transformation of political freedom, but also 
a period of severe economic crisis due to the 
global financial crisis since 1997. The economic 
meltdown contributed to the increasing of the 
unemployed number. At the same time, there 
was a growing number of civilian militia groups 
where most of the partisans are jobless people. 
The mushroomed of religious hardliner 
groups also got influenced by global political 
constellation. The 9/11 tragedy and the USA 
invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, for example, 
were perceived as a turning point for the 
Islamic groups to struggle against the Western 
domination. Therefore, most of the hardliner 
groups frequently express their resistance 
toward West policies and actions in Muslim 
countries. The existence of Ahmadiyah has 
been frequently linked as the West intervenes to 
make Indonesia Muslim disunited and always 
engaged in quarrels. Among the hardliners, the 
Ahmadiyah is more than heresy matter, but also 
represents a symbol of the West wickedness 
that should be stopped immediately.
The presence of liberalist and pluralist 
groups who take sides on Ahmadis has 
amplified allegation about the closeness between 
Ahmadiyah and the Western counterparts. Ahma-
diyah then became an object of a great dispute 
between conservatives and liberalist groups 
about how the country should signify democracy. 
The conservatives, such as FPI, MMI (Indonesia 
Mujahidin Council), and Laskar Jihad (Jihad 
Force) regard democracy should not disrupt 
religious ease and strongly reject pluralism in 
religious life. They often use mass power and 
act as a police to crush things they consider as 
contradict to Islam values (Ali, 2006: 99). The 
presence of liberalist groups allegedly received 
funding from the United States and in line with 
Western imperialism (Husaini & Hidayat, 2002: 
172). 
From the other side, the liberalist and pluralist 
groups view the democracy should celebrate 
pluralism, toleration, and be dissociated from 
religious authority intervention. Corresponding 
to Ahmadiyah issue, the conservative group 
considers the presence of Ahmadiyah is part of 
a liberal agenda that supported by foreigners to 
destroy the purity of Islam in Indonesia. This 
view has been established on since the beginning 
of the Ahmadiyah rejection in Sumatra. Ahma-
diyah group was believed to be loyalists of 
Queen Victoria, which was formed in order to 
provoke a political clash in Muslim colonial 
countries (Ropi, 2010: 285). The liberalist and 
pluralist groups accused the conservative groups 
obtaining financial support from Saudi Arabia 
to spread their ideology in Indonesia. They 
see the violence against Ahmadiyah carried 
by the conservatives is a proof that the Saudi 
Arabia values  and ideology is unacceptable in 
Indonesia democratic life. The dimensions of the 
conflict become complicated because some NU 
scholars, Musthofa Bisri and Said Agil Siradj 
tends to support the JIL movement and helped 
provide discourse against conservative groups. 
Thus, the conservatives had to face some of NU 
elites when attacking Ahmadiyah. 
Another problem around Ahmadiyah 
conflict is related to the subjectivity of religious 
freedom meaning. The pro-Ahmadiyah perceived 
the banning of Ahmadiyah activities in public 
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space was controvert to the national constitution 
that guarantees the freedom of religion. On the 
other side, the anti-Ahmadiyah considers the 
presence of Ahmadiyah has tarnished Islam and 
created inconvenience for the Muslims. The 
constitution is also called the state to protect 
the freedom of all religious adherents who do 
not want their religion being spoiled by other 
groups’ effort. Thus, it was not easy at all for the 
government to resolve the conflict with mixture 
dimension of religious issues and the authority 
contest between religious leaders and camps that 
brought their own civilian militia group. Adnan 
Buyung Nasution said that the decree was 
actually against Ahmadis discrimination and its 
purposes to limit the movement of Ahmadiyah 
in order to avoid a wider conflict (Fuller, 2011: 
12).
CONCLUSION
The conflict of Ahmadiyah was not solely 
about the heresy issue that charged on the 
Ahmadis, but involving the calsh of values, 
ideas, and authorities between the liberalist 
or pluralist groups and the conservatives who 
struggle to control democracy. The Ahmadiyah 
themselves became a commodity issue of the 
conflicting parties. There was no real action, 
a dialogue for example, which initiated by 
the liberalist group or pluralist group with 
the conservatives and government to seek 
resolutions at least to put aside the Ahmadis 
from the violent undertaking. The presence of 
hostility between liberalist group and pluralist 
group versus the conservatives has complicated 
the problem that besets Ahmadiyah.
While most studies explain the central 
problem of Ahmadiyah case is the strengthening 
of intolerance and radical groups reconciliation 
in Indonesia. Without denying that explanation, 
this study saw the Ahmadiyah decree as a 
policy that intends to anticipate a wider conflict 
between the two camps who equally have a 
large amount of mass that do not hesitate to use 
violent means. If the policy were not issued, 
the two major camps would be involved in 
a severe bloody conflict, which in turn could 
shatter national stability. Using the perspective 
of public policy functions to provide social 
order, the enactment of Ahmadiyah decree was 
a government effort to protect the existence of 
Ahmadiyah by banning their activities in public 
places due to the potential danger to their safety. 
The role of public policy on religious conflict 
should be emphasized on community interest 
as a collective entity and bring social order on 
the top list to be accomplished than to meet the 
demands of each opposing party.
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